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Abstract 
This paper examines partisan communications of incumbent members of Congress during the 
nine weeks leading up to the U.S. 2016 election. The central premise is rooted in the median 
voter theorem, which is coupled with theories of political activation and reinforcement, to show 
how politicians communicate in order to attract support from large swaths of the public. We 
analyze the partisanship of tweets posted by incumbents in Congress using mixed-effects models 
to examine the relationships between party, time, and race competitiveness on the degree of 
partisanship expressed by politicians. Our results reveal that Democrats and Republicans 
exhibited different partisanship signaling patterns in the weeks before the election. Specifically, 
Democrats decreased their partisanship, perhaps to appeal to the median voter, while 
Republicans stayed consistent in their partisanship, potentially using Twitter to activate and 
reinforce voters rather than to win them over. 
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Introduction 
Political polarization has been widely discussed in political communication research and the 
popular press for over half a century (see, e.g., Sunstein, 2001). Politicians sort into clear camps 
with little overlap between groups, making it hard for them to establish common ground from 
which to govern1. These polarized parties have clear differences even if the gap between those 
positions is narrow. The general sense is that partisanship—parties’ efforts to make the 
distinction between parties clear—is increasing (see, e.g., Andris et al., 2015; Baldassarri & 
Gelman, 2008; Brady & Han, 2006; Poole & Rosenthal, 1984), meaning politicians are more 
effectively sorting themselves into non-overlapping groups, creating problems for multi-party 
governance (Jesuit & Williams, 2017). As parties become more clearly differentiated, the inter-
party gap becomes institutionalized. 
In this paper, we examine the dynamics of the inter-party gap, focusing particularly on the nature 
of partisan communications of incumbent members of Congress (MCs) during the 2016 U.S. 
election cycle. We formally test hypotheses rooted in campaign-related theories—the median 
voter theorem in particular—that predict various strategies for partisan or nonpartisan messaging. 
We use #polar scores (Hemphill, Culotta, & Heston, 2016) to measure the partisanship of tweets 
posted by incumbents in Congress and then use mixed-effects models to examine the 
relationships between party, time, and race competitiveness on the degree of partisanship 
expressed by candidates. #Polar scores are a partisanship measure that rely on the hashtags used 
by MCs to estimate individuals’ positions on a liberal-conservative spectrum, and #polar scores’ 
correlation with DW-NOMINATE shows that politicians effectively sort themselves into parties 
                                                   
1 We use the term “polarization” when referring to measures of how dispersed political actors are or how 
ideologically consistent they are, not how extreme they are (Curini & Hino, 2012; Pew Research Center, 2014; 
Smidt, 2017). 
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through their hashtag use. By analyzing how #polar scores change over time and vary between 
parties, we are able to specifically analyze how candidates adjust their partisan signals in the 
period leading up to an election. 
We found Democrats and Republicans exhibit different partisanship signaling patterns in the 
weeks preceding the 2016 elections: Democrats decreased their partisanship, following the 
“median voter” (Downs, 1957) playbook, while Republicans remained consistent in their 
messaging and thus used Twitter to activate and reinforce (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 
1948) their base. These differences suggest that the two parties use social media differently, and 
that we are just beginning to understand the impacts of those differences. 
Background and Hypotheses 
Political Polarization and Partisanship 
From 1972 to 2008, both Democrats and Republicans among the general public moved further 
to, respectively, the left and right of “ideologically center,” effectively widening the gap between 
each party’s average member (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008; Lee, 2008). Over the same period, 
moderates positioned at the center of the ideological spectrum dropped from 35 to 27 percent of 
the American voting public (Abramowitz & Fiorina, 2013) while party loyalty, measured by the 
percentage of Democrats and Republicans voting along straight-ticket lines, increased 
(Baldassarri & Gelman, 2008). For example, 2016 exit polls show 89 percent of Democrats and 
90 percent of Republicans voted for, respectively, Clinton and Trump (Huang, Jacoby, 
Strickland, & Lai, 2016). Some argue the polarization of the American electorate is not a recent 
phenomenon (Fiorina & Abrams, 2008; Fiorina, Abrams, & Pope, 2011; Jensen et al., 2012) and 
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that it simply reflects a more “sorted” electorate where party affiliation and ideology are now 
more strongly affiliated (Fiorina et al., 2011; Levendusky, 2010).  
Polarization is, in part, a function of shifts in political marketing as politicians attempt to reframe 
the policy agenda and their own political positions in ways that eventually filter into the 
traditional media (Shapiro & Hemphill, 2017). This process has been occurring over an extended 
period of time with analyses of congressional language over 130 years revealing higher levels of 
ideological polarization in the past (Jensen et al., 2012)2. However, after controlling for finite-
sample and other previously ignored biases, Gentzkow, Shapiro, & Taddy (2016) showed that 
partisan language has in fact significantly increased since the early 1990s. They analyzed 
Congressional speeches and argued that the specific type of language used within each party has 
grown increasingly distinct from the opposite party when communicating about virtually the 
same topics. The original #polar score study (Hemphill et al., 2016) reveals that these 
distinctions are also present on Twitter in that parties use distinctly different hashtags even when 
discussing the same issue3. Given that politicians attempt to reach particular and targeted 
audiences (Hemsley, Stromer-Galley, Semaan, & Tanupabrungsun, 2018; Kreiss, 2016), it 
follows that their partisanship is part of an overall messaging strategy. 
In summary, polarization and partisanship are not new, but the effects of nuanced language 
differences are a more recent phenomenon. In addition, the extant research does not yet explain 
the relationship between the political campaign cycle and the short-term patterns of partisan 
messages used by American politicians. Assuming such patterns of partisan messaging play a 
                                                   
2 The methods employed in (Jensen et al., 2012) are consistent with those identifying key policy topics in 
congressional press statements via Bayesian inference, shown elsewhere in Grimmer (2010) and Quinn et al. (2010). 
3 For instance, #getcovered and #trainwreck were both used to discuss the Affordable Care Act. Democrats used 
#getcovered to encourage constituents to purchase insurance on the exchanges the ACA established while 
Republicans used #trainwreck to criticize the bill and the exchanges. 
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significant role in politicians’ campaign strategies, it is now prudent to expand upon and 
integrate novel forms of communication into our current understanding of the impacts of 
partisanship.  
Congress and Its Audiences 
The impact of Congress’s social media use depends in part on the audience of their messages, 
which in turn influences how social media tools might be used. There is research showing that 
Congress assumes its social media audience is more politically engaged (Williams & Gulati, 
2010) and that they consider campaign websites, Facebook pages, and Twitter feeds effective 
tools for communicating with voters (Druckman, Kifer, & Parkin, 2017a). Little work has been 
done to examine who follows politicians, but the existing research suggests that followers are 
opinion leaders (Karlsen, 2015) or at least people who are more politically engaged than most 
voters (Norris & Curtice, 2008). Research also shows that Congress’s Twitter use impacts 
mainstream media coverage of political issues (Shapiro & Hemphill, 2017). Taken together, the 
research on the likely audiences and impacts of congressional Twitter use suggest multiple routes 
through which messages can reach voters, with some pathways more direct than others. We 
assume congressional tweets are used to present a more or less partisan image, and we measure 
how partisan their tweets make them appear. Because Twitter is a source for political journalists 
(Broersma & Graham, 2013; Lawrence, Molyneux, Coddington, & Holton, 2014), tweets often 
appear in mainstream media where they can reach voters, even those voters who do not use 
Twitter or follow politicians. Social media is an increasingly important source of political news 
for Americans (Mitchell, Gottfried, Barthel, & Shearer, 2016), and Congress influences the 
topics and framing that appear in that news (Conway, Kenski, & Wang, 2015; Shapiro & 
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Hemphill, 2017; Towner & Muñoz, 2017). That the audience for politicians’ tweets is not solely 
comprised of their constituents but also journalists and the public outside of a politician’s district 
suggests Twitter use can influence electoral politics by impacting which issues and actors receive 
media attention (Shapiro & Hemphill, 2017). Interviews with campaign staffers highlight the 
importance of political journalists as targets of campaign messages (Kreiss, 2016)4.  
Politicians and candidates recognize the strategic importance of social media for appealing to 
individual constituencies and raising their individual profiles and even use paid consultants to 
help craft their online messaging strategies (Howard, 2005). Further, between parties, there is 
little variation in social media adoption (Chi & Yang, 2011; Shapiro & Hemphill, 2017; Vergeer 
& Hermans, 2013; Williams & Gulati, 2010). With regard to Twitter specifically, we know that 
MCs are getting more sophisticated in how they use it, with early studies showing that most 
tweets served to disseminate information (Golbeck, Grimes, & Rogers, 2010; Hemphill, 
Otterbacher, & Shapiro, 2013), while more recent research confirms that articulating policy 
positions and communicating to constituents are increasingly common (Glassman, Straus, & 
Shogan, 2013; Straus, Williams, Shogan, & Glassman, 2014; Zhang, Stromer-Galley, et al., 
2017). Existing research suggests that campaigns’ online messaging strategies change over time, 
increasing calls to action and reducing persuasive messages as elections near (Zhang, 
Tanupabrungsun, et al., 2017)5. Twitter’s affordances, such as mentions, are also used to specify 
audiences for content (Hemsley et al., 2018); for instance, mentioning a specific media outlet 
when providing information about an upcoming event. Given this research about how Congress 
                                                   
4 On Twitter, politicians are also engaged in many simultaneous forms of political communication: e.g., press 
outreach, agenda setting, constituent engagement, and issue debate. We recognize that active campaign messaging is 
not the only, or even necessarily the primary, purpose of tweets. This does not diminish their utility for examining 
partisanship before elections, however. 
5 In general, campaigns did not use Twitter for get-out-the-vote campaigns or for fundraising (Frechette & Ancu, 
2017). 
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uses social media generally, and Twitter specifically, Twitter is an appropriate site for studying 
Congress’s messaging strategies. 
Campaign Strategies 
Literature on campaigns and party strategy offers explanations about why politicians select 
certain partisan messages over others, but it is also connected to theories about campaigning, 
voters’ decisions, and how party loyalty and unity help lawmakers appeal to voters. The primary 
reason that these areas of research are not entirely distinct from each other is that the 
relationships between party loyalty, party unity, and voter choice help explain why politicians 
would invoke varying degrees of partisanship while campaigning for office. Here, we provide a 
brief overview of the literature on these relationships. 
First, the median voter theorem suggests that a majority-voting mechanism will result in the 
outcome preferred by the median voter. The theorem assumes that voters occupy a single point 
on an ideological spectrum (i.e., conservative vs liberal) at which they are most satisfied, and, as 
the electoral outcome gets further from that point on the spectrum, they become consistently less 
satisfied. Campaigning in line with the median voter theorem would suggest that moving to the 
middle before a general election would be a successful strategy. Research indicates that this 
rhetorical shift does occur; for instance, in 2012 Obama and Romney both invoked a language 
style unique to each party early in their campaigns but both candidates sounded more and more 
similar as the election neared (Hart & Lind, 2013).  
To clarify, according to Downs (1957), and in line with updates to this line of inquiry (e.g., 
Cormack, 2016), the median voter theorem specifically argues that  
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1. Politicians will communicate in ways that will attract support from large swaths of the 
public; politicians will primarily emphasize those issues that the majority of the public, 
represented by the median voter, agrees about; and  
2. Politicians will communicate in ways which differentiate themselves from members of 
the opposite party in order to provide a clear distinction when it comes time for 
individuals to vote; politicians will take positions different from those of their opponents. 
We predict that, as the election nears, politicians will adjust their rhetorical strategies to be less 
partisan in attempts to appeal to the median voter. While Downs (1957) makes no explicit 
mention of the influence of time, we test whether appeals change over time in light of research 
suggesting that candidates position themselves on Twitter differently during primaries and 
general elections (Shapiro, Hemphill, & Otterbacher, 2017). We examine the general election 
period (roughly Labor Day to Election Day - see, e.g., (Broh, 1980; Traugott, 2005; Wlezien & 
Erikson, 2002)) specifically to determine whether change occurs within that time frame; prior 
work indicates a rhetorical shift to the median among presidential candidates during that period 
(Hart & Lind, 2013). Any movement toward the center would still leave candidates more 
appealing to more extreme voters of their party than their opponent, leading us to our initial 
hypothesis: 
H1: As the election nears, politicians will communicate in less polarized ways. 
Second, we turn to the literature on party loyalty in campaign messaging. Schoenberger’s (1969) 
study of the 1964 presidential election—in which Barry Goldwater (Republican) ran 
unsuccessfully against incumbent Lyndon Johnson (Democrat)—focuses on one of the most 
lopsided elections in U.S. history given Goldwater’s 38.5-percent vote share. For Schoenberger, 
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this election provided the basis for understanding how presidential races influence down-ticket 
campaign strategies: Goldwater was wildly unpopular as a candidate for the general public, and 
his lack of popularity presented down-ticket Republicans with a more appealing choice of 
dissociating themselves from the top of the ticket to create broader appeal to the electorate. 
Indeed, candidates who withheld support for Goldwater benefited from that choice, 
demonstrating that party unity and loyalty are not always requirements of the electorate and thus 
not axiomatic preferences for candidates. In contrast to Downs’ (1957) assumption of party 
loyalty among candidates, Schoenberger’s (1969) finding suggests partisan messages—i.e., 
indicators of party loyalty—provide varying benefits to candidates depending on how their 
party’s presidential nominee is viewed by the electorate. In the weeks before the 2016 election, 
candidate Trump trailed candidate Clinton in public polls and among their parties’ elites. During 
the time period we analyzed in the present study, Gallup estimated Congressional approval 
between 18-20 percent (Gallup, n.d.). The literature suggests that under those conditions, 
Republicans would demonstrate less party loyalty and that minority party incumbents 
(Democrats) could have enjoyed an advantage by positioning themselves against Congress. 
Incumbents debate policy issues online openly (Druckman, Hennessy, Kifer, & Parkin, 2009) 
and enjoy wide advantages in large part because of the press coverage they have already received 
while serving in office (Prior, 2006). However, whether they are in the minority or majority party 
still matters. When Congress is popular, majority party incumbents enjoy stronger advantages, 
and the race is essentially theirs to lose (Jones, 2010). This can lead to decreases in messaging 
overall as candidates avoid saying things that may hurt their reelection chances.  
Given this literature on the relationship between in- and out-party strategies and the influence of 
a presidential candidate, we expect that, in 2016, Republican and in-party candidates adopted 
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less extreme polarization strategies in order to counter the effects of low Congressional approval 
and an unpopular presidential candidate. This leads us to a second hypothesis: 
H2: Majority party incumbents (Republicans) will exhibit lower levels of polarization 
than minority party incumbents (Democrats). 
Third, we discuss other implications low approval had for incumbents. Coupled with low 
Congressional approval, increased polarization increases the risk of vote loss for majority-party 
candidates, meaning that polarization would have been more dangerous when approval was low 
(Jones, 2010), as it was in 2016. This may explain why, in a study of campaign websites, 
candidates in competitive races were less likely to link to their party’s sites given the desire for 
control over their messaging (Druckman, Kifer, Parkin, & Klar, 2011). The same practice may 
have occurred on Twitter in 2016 as politicians attempted to control connections to their party by 
including or excluding party links from their descriptions and tweets. Based on televised 
advertisements from Congressional elections held between 1998 and 2008, Neiheisel and Niebler 
(2013) found that candidates running where voters are predisposed to vote according to party 
affiliation emphasized their own party affiliations. Candidates in open races (i.e., where there is 
no incumbent), however, were less likely to advertise their party affiliations, implying that the 
electorate is necessarily malleable. There are nuances to this malleability, however, as 
Lazarsfeld, et al. (1948) showed that campaign propaganda were far more effective at reinforcing 
(i.e., strengthening the resolve of existing support) and activating (i.e., triggering voters to make 
decisions based on existing predispositions) voters’ choices than converting them. Partisan 
messages are also employed by candidates as a function of how they perceive the ideological 
positions of both their respective parties as well as their opposition. Assuming that two 
categories of voters must be attended to by candidates—base voters and swing voters (Cox & 
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McCubbins, 1986)—campaigns may strategically avoid highlighting party loyalties, or even 
party affiliation. Based on this literature, and reflecting Schoenberger’s (1969) finding that party 
loyalty offers varying benefits based on how the party’s presidential nominee is viewed by the 
electorate, we expect that candidates in close races will adopt less extreme messaging strategies 
as they attempt to avoid being defined solely by their party affiliation. This leads to our final 
hypothesis: 
H3: Incumbents in close races will exhibit lower levels of polarization. 
In summary, campaign effects, party loyalty, and polarization predict that candidates will align 
themselves with their party when the top of the ticket is popular and when the party’s message 
appeals to voters’ predispositions. Reasonable strategies emphasizing reinforcement and 
activation could produce partisan messaging. Yet, when focusing on voters who are not 
predisposed to support a particular candidate, these same messaging strategies would no longer 
be effective. In order to test these hypotheses about the overall trend in partisanship and the 
impact of party affiliation and race closeness, we analyzed the tweets posted by incumbents in 
the weeks prior to the election. We turn now to the methods we employed to test these 
hypotheses. 
Method 
We collected 25,483 tweets posted by 458 official Twitter accounts for members of both 
chambers of Congress (259 Republicans and 199 Democrats; 396 Representatives and 62 
Senators) who were running for re-election in 20166. We then used those tweets to calculate 
                                                   
6 469 seats were up for election in November 2016. 
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weekly measures of polarization (#polar scores) over the last nine weeks of the campaign. By 
“official” accounts, we mean those paid for with public funds, which are not supposed to support 
re-election efforts but rather serve as official communication channels for the office. This affords 
us an opportunity to study partisanship in official communications and provides what is likely a 
conservative measure of partisan behavior by MCs, meaning that MCs are constrained in what 
they may post on their official accounts (Committee on House Administration, n.d.; Davidson 
McGuire Woods, 2014). These 458 accounts include all sitting MCs who ran for re-election in 
2016 and whose accounts were still accessible in early 2017. We then employed mixed effects 
regression models to predict #polar scores, using party, time, and margin of victory as fixed 
effects7. Because we collected data in 2017, some MCs had deleted their tweets or accounts, 
meaning there are eleven missing accounts from the period. Individual tweets may also be 
missing because they were deleted. Accounts or tweets were deleted for different reasons, 
including losing a re-election campaign, winning but being nominated to Trump’s cabinet, or a 
tweet containing a typo. To check the robustness of our models against deletion of both tweets 
and accounts, we used regressions with random deletions and outlier deletions. In all cases, the 
effects remained unchanged8. 
Sample and measures 
To collect Twitter handles, we used a crowd-sourced list of official Twitter accounts for MCs 
from the @unitedstates project9. We analyzed the tweets posted by 458 accounts associated with 
                                                   
7 Both our data (in CSV format) and our analysis (as R notebook and HTML files) are available in Supplementary 
Materials. 
8 Complete model specification and output for all regressions are available in Supplementary Materials. 
9 https://github.com/unitedstates/congress-legislators  
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MCs, which comprise the population of verifiable accounts active during the period under 
examination and who ran in the 2016 election. For all the Twitter accounts available for MCs as 
of November 2016, we then used purpletag (Culotta & Hemphill, 2016) to collect tweets and 
calculate #polar scores, i.e., estimates of politicians’ positions on a liberal-conservative spectrum 
based on the hashtags they include in their tweets. #Polar scores provide a measure of how well-
sorted various hashtags and users are, and it uses Congress’s own tweets to generate scores. They 
employ a machine learning approach, specifically a chi-squared feature selection algorithm, to 
predict party affiliation based on hashtag use and achieve 98 percent accuracy (Hemphill et al., 
2016). MCs demonstrate sophisticated use of hashtags within tweets, and individual tags are 
rarely employed by both parties (Gainous & Wagner, 2014; Hemphill et al., 2016; Shapiro & 
Hemphill, 2017; Straus et al., 2014). Like other left-to-right, two-dimensional measures (e.g., 
Carroll et al., 2011; Gabel & Huber, 2000), #polar scores collapse multidimensional policy 
issues into a single spectrum. We assume this spectrum serves as a sort of “super issue” under 
which variation exists but that generally maps to the two major parties (Gabel & Huber, 2000). 
To calculate #polar scores, and based on the assumption that “polarization” refers to ideological 
consistency rather than extremity (Curini & Hino, 2012; Pew Research Center, 2014; Smidt, 
2017), each hashtag is first scored, and then the scores of all hashtags a user posts are summed to 
create a user’s #polar score. For instance, #flashbackfriday and #wagegap were the most liberal 
tags used during the week of the election, while #betterway and #obamacare were the most 
conservative during the same week. Democrats use the #flashbackfriday Twitter convention 
more often than Republicans, typically to refer to a time when policies they preferred were being 
implemented (e.g., “#flashbackfriday: This year 57,000 kids didn't get the same chance I did w 
.@HeadStartgov. Time to end #sequestration http://t.co/v3DZTfem3h” - Rep. Loretta Sanchez 
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[D-CA]) or when they did something their followers supported (e.g., “#flashbackfriday Why I 
supported Occupy Wall Street http://t.co/G8M5EfuL2T http://t.co/FbtObOuptT @Azi 
http://t.co/DfAsXTBKua” - Rep. Charles Rangel [D-NY]; “#flashbackfriday to delivering Meals 
on Wheels in Nashua. We can't allow a program that brightens the lives of so… 
https://t.co/MFTHROGwwV” - Rep. Ann McLane Kuster [D-NH]). Republicans used 
#betterway to refer to their platform generally (e.g., “#OH12 families deserve a #betterway 
https://t.co/wMCz06S6A3” - Rep. Pat Tiberi [R-OH]; “It's time for Conservative ideas to shine. 
Check out our plans here: #betterway https://t.co/dKkh9haZF4” - Rep. Steve Scalise [R-LA]). 
These examples illustrate MCs common, nuanced, and sophisticated use of hashtags as well as 
their use of @mentions and providing links to more information. We calculated #polar scores for 
each user for each day and analyzed their changes over time by averaging scores over each of the 
nine weeks in our sample. 
#Polar scores are centered around zero where negative scores are liberal and positive scores are 
conservative. This scaling recognizes and builds on other polarization measures using negative-
to-positive or liberal-to-conservative scales, including DW-NOMINATE (Carroll et al., 2011; 
Lewis & Poole, 2004; Poole & Rosenthal, 1985) and variants of it based on campaign finance 
data that connect candidates to their supporters and affiliated interest groups (Barber & McCarty, 
2013); (Bonica, 2013, 2014). In the original #polar scores study, Hemphill and colleagues (2016) 
found correlations between #polar scores and DW-NOMINATE were high for both the House 
(r(331) = 0.80, p < 0.001) and the Senate (r(76) = 0.83, p < 0.001). Tausanovitch and Warshaw’s 
(2017) meta-analysis of measures of candidates’ ideological orientations suggests that 
unobserved incentives and contexts are likely impacting measures differently; #polar scores 
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correlate with DW-NOMINATE more closely than the other measures they examined (e.g. CF 
Scores (Bonica, 2014), Twitter followers (Barberá, 2015)). 
Unlike standard calculations of #polar scores, we modified the typical #polar score calculated 
method by generating hashtag scores based on the entire nine-week period and then using those 
scores to calculate scores for individual users. Hashtag scores change over time as different users 
adopt them and their attention to issues vary. #Polar scores default calculations use one-day and 
one-week time windows over which hashtag use is measured. By setting the time window to the 
entire period from Labor Day to Election Day, which is usually considered the general election 
period (see, e.g., (Broh, 1980; Traugott, 2005; Wlezien & Erikson, 2002)), and by calculating 
just one score per hashtag based on its use during that period, we effectively control for variance 
in the level of attention issues receive week-to-week. By Weeks run Monday—Sunday and 
began on September 5, 2016 (Labor Day). 
We used election results data from BallotPedia (“Election results 2016,” n.d.) and individual 
state election records to construct measures of race competitiveness, which is in line with Cox 
and Munger’s (1989) closeness measure. This approach is adequate for two-party races such as 
those for individual congressional seats. Our outcome and predictor measures are listed in Table 
1. 
Table 1. Measures included in linear mixed-effects models 
Variable Type Operationalization 
abs  outcome Absolute value of the average partisanship of the member of 
Congress’s Twitter feed for a particular week, i.e., the 
absolute value of the #polar score 
handle predictor Twitter handle associated with the member of Congress’s 
account 
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party 
(Republican) 
predictor 1 = Republican; 0 = Democratic 
week predictor Number of the week where 1 = week following Labor Day 
margin of 
victory 
predictor Ratio of votes separating the winner and the runner-up to sum 
of votes both candidates received 
Analysis approach 
Linear mixed models were used to analyze the effect of party and week on #polar scores. We 
used R (R Core Team, 2016) and lme4 (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015) to analyze the 
relationships between time, party, margin, and partisanship. A mixed model approach was 
employed rather than a standard linear model because #polar score and handle are interdependent 
(i.e., how partisan an MCs’ messages are depends in part on individual characteristics such as the 
state he represents or his prior partisanship). In this way, we expected variation in both party and 
handle to influence partisanship (#polar score) from week to week. All models were fit using 
maximum likelihood estimation. For fixed effects, we included week, party, and margin. We also 
include fixed main effects for measures for gender, congressional chamber, and years in office, 
as these characteristics are commonly included in studies of MCs. For random effects, we 
included intercepts for Twitter handles and by-handle random slopes for week, allowing us to 
assume that handles may start with different #polar scores and that handles may respond to time 
differently. For instance, events like polls may occur during the focal time period in some 
jurisdictions but not in others, triggering a different response from handles with new polling 
information. We visually inspected residual plots and used p-values from likelihood ratio tests of 
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the full model compared with other models to evaluate the significance of the variables in 
question10.  
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Figure 1 shows each party's average #polar scores for each week, highlighting how Republicans 
exhibited more variation within their party (on average, larger variance within each week), while 
Democrats exhibited more variation from week to week. It also makes clear that week two was 
an outlier for Democrats11 and that most communication by members of each party was partisan, 
i.e., primarily falling above zero. 
 
                                                   
10 For instance, we constructed models with fewer predictors (e.g., party alone) and without random effects. The 
results of all models are available in the supplementary materials. 
11 Democrats had average scores that were nearly two to three times as large during week two relative to other 
weeks. When we analyze just the last seven weeks (weeks three–nine), the direction and magnitude of our results 
remain unchanged. During week two, the most polarized tags among Democrats were #closetheloophole (-59), 
#gunvote (-37), #doyourjob (-35), and #noflynobuy (-31). The Congressional Record shows House Democrats made 
multiple attempts to bring gun-related legislation to the floor on September 14 (e.g., Rep. Lawrence [D-MI] on H.R. 
1217 and Rep. Matt Cartwright [D-PA] on H.R. 1076). The large #polar scores for that week resulted from the 
Democrats’ coordinated efforts to message around gun control legislation on the 14th; our data include 300 tweets 
with the #GunVote hashtag on September 14 alone. Not all, but the vast majority of those tweets were posted by 
Democrats. 
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Figure 1. #Polar scores (absolute value) over time for each party.  
Dots represent means, and whiskers represent standard errors. 
Regression Results 
To evaluate our hypotheses, we ran linear mixed-effects models predicting the partisanship of 
messages using combinations of party, time, and Twitter handle. The results of our models are 
available in Table 2. Model 3 achieved best fit. ANOVA-based comparisons of these models 
confirmed that, although models 4 and 5 have lower AIC than model 3, these differences were 
not significant. The results in Table 2 also indicate that partisanship decreased over time (𝛽 = -
117.29, p < 0.001). In order to examine the precise interaction between party and week, we 
present the results of their interaction in the last two columns of Table 2: Democrats’ messages 
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grew significantly less partisan as the election drew near (𝛽 = -110.01, p < 0.001) while 
Republicans’ partisanship did not change significantly (𝛽 = 2.82, p = 0.522). 
We also checked for influential individuals and outliers using Cook’s distance measures. Though 
we did identify outliers by this measure, removing them (individually or as a group) did not 
change the significance or direction of the results in the overall model. The inclusion of gender, 
chamber, or tenure of office as control variables, shown in model 5, also had no impact on the 
significance or direction of the results in the overall model. We used ANOVA to compare 
models and found Model 3 to be the parsimonious model of best fit. 
 1 2 3 4 5 GOP Dems 
Week -47.44 *** 
(6.91) 
-53.61 *** 
(4.64) 
-117.29 *** 
(9.32) 
-117.27 *** 
(9.32) 
-117.54 *** 
(9.32) 
0.56  
(4.36) 
-113.18 *** 
(12.42) 
Party 
(GOP) 
 -290.64 *** 
(58.20) 
-878.60 *** 
(95.63) 
-873.08 *** 
(96.15) 
-846.05 *** 
(97.79) 
  
Party 
(GOP) x 
Week 
  125.10 *** 
(12.56) 
125.08 *** 
(12.56) 
125.01 *** 
(12.56) 
  
Margin    0.65  
(1.17) 
   
Gender 
(man) 
    -96.59  
(70.19) 
  
Chamber 
(senate) 
    112.85  
(80.64) 
  
Years in 
office 
    2.39  
(2.92) 
  
(Intercept) 555.13 *** 
(51.72) 
747.41 *** 
(48.76) 
1048.39 *** 
(71.50) 
1022.76 *** 
(84.99) 
1064.54 *** 
(92.12) 
195.80 *** 
(31.17) 
1049.94 *** 
(95.34) 
Random Effects 
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Handle 964130.89 304616.43 779071.66 779229.61 769754.84 159828.49 1612766.75 
Handle, 
week 
13112.30   9409.81 9409.48 9390.46 1373.98 22359.31 
Nhandle 458 458 458 458 458 273 218 
AIC 49,962 50,321 49,875 49,876 49,875 27,434 25,533 
Table 2. Results of linear mixed model regressions predicting the absolute values of #polar scores. Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses under coefficients, and *** indicates p < .001. 
Hypothesis Testing Results 
H1: Less Partisanship as Election Nears 
Our results indicate that overall, Congress exhibits less partisanship as the election nears (for 
“week”, 𝛽 = -117.29, p < 0.001), but most of this effect is driven by less partisanship among 
Democrats. This is confirmed in the last two columns of Table 2, presenting separate 
Republican-only and Democrat-only models where week is insignificant for Republicans. In 
other words, Republicans exhibited more partisan messaging as the election neared, but the 
increase was not statistically significant overall. Partisanship among Republicans peaks in week 
8 (see Figure 1), but there is not an overall trend of increasing partisanship. Over the same 
period, Democrats’ polarization decreased significantly. Overall, we find support for H1 both 
overall and among Democrats: partisanship decreased near the election. 
H2: Lower Partisanship among Republicans 
Compared to Democrats, Republicans were less polarized throughout the time period. Even as 
Democrats became less polarized and Republicans became more so, Republicans still exhibited 
lower scores. As illustrated in Figure 1, only in week eight were Republicans’ scores higher than 
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Democrats’.  Therefore, we find some support for H2: majority party users exhibited less 
polarized messaging. In the first month of the general election period, Democrats’ scores were 
much higher than Republicans’. In the last few weeks, their scores were not meaningfully 
different except for the week before the election where Republicans' scores were higher. 
H3: Lower Scores in Close Races 
We used the margin of victory to measure race competitiveness. Including margin of victory in 
the models did not improve their performance as measured by ANOVA. With regard to H3 
specifically, we found no significant relationship between margin and partisanship (𝛽 = 0.65, p = 
0.577). This was also the case when we tested the impact of race competitiveness using margin 
thresholds of 6 percent, 12 percent, and 25 percent. While the distribution of margin suggested 
these thresholds were meaningful, they did not significantly impact #polar scores. Therefore, we 
do not find support for H3: incumbents in close races, where closeness is measured using any 
competitiveness threshold, did not appear to use different partisan messaging strategies. 
Discussion 
We set out to understand whether legislators were appealing to (a) voters near the middle of the 
political spectrum or (b) voters in their respective bases. Based on prior work about the median 
voter (Downs, 1957), activation, conversion, and reinforcement (Lazarsfeld et al., 1948), and 
polarization (Jones, 2010; Schoenberger, 1969), we generated hypotheses about the changes in 
polarization that would appear over time as well as the differences that would be visible between 
parties. We found that Democrats and Republicans behaved differently throughout the nine-week 
period before the election. Specifically, Democrats began the period quite polarized in their 
rhetoric but moved toward the middle as the election neared. Republicans started the period near 
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the middle and finished it virtually unchanged. These findings reveal a number of novel 
distinctions between the parties and confirm the impacts of time, but not race competitiveness, 
on a politician’s messaging strategy. 
We found that time, i.e., week, was a significant predictor of messaging for Democrats and 
throughout the period. According to the median voter theorem (Downs, 1957), candidates should 
attempt to appeal to voters near the middle of the political spectrum in order to capture the votes 
of all people more extreme than they are in one direction and those who are less extreme than 
their opponent in the other. Democrats’ messaging behaviors indicate that this model provides a 
reasonable explanation of their strategy. The margin of victory in races—our measure of 
closeness or race competitiveness—was not a strong predictor, indicating that messaging in close 
races was not different from messaging in likely victories. Candidates did not appear to 
downplay their party affiliations or to appear less partisan in an effort to appeal to centrists. Party 
loyalty may in fact be dominating candidates’ preferences. We also note that, though prior work 
has found differences between men and women in Congress on Twitter (Wagner, Gainous, & 
Holman, 2017), especially during campaigns (Evans & Clark, 2016; Evans, Cordova, & Sipole, 
2014; Meeks, 2016), we observed no meaningful differences here. We turn now to possible 
explanations for the differences we found. 
Appealing to the Median or to the Base 
For a median voter or centrist appeal to work, candidates must convert at least some voters from 
the other party. Lazarsfeld and colleagues (1948) suggest that this is quite difficult, even when 
voters face choosing an extreme candidate within their own party. This difficulty partially 
explains how Republicans’ pattern of starting with low polarization but becoming marginally 
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more polarized over time could be an effective election campaign strategy12. That is, by selecting 
a low baseline position, Republicans made appeals consistent with the attitudes of centrist voters, 
potentially capturing those that could be easily converted. Meanwhile, by increasing their 
polarization just before the election (in week 8), they could be effectively appealing to existing 
partisans and likely activating them—i.e., convincing them to vote Republican—just in time for 
the election. The stark partisan divides on social media (Mergel, 2012; Smith et al., 2011) 
suggest that it would be an opportune venue for reaching those already predisposed to a 
lawmaker’s message—to activate and reinforce existing preferences—rather than to target the 
non-predisposed with social media-based messaging. That we saw more rather than less 
partisanship among Republicans as the election neared suggests they were following an 
activation strategy rather than appealing to a median voter or attempting conversion. Given this 
greater voter turnout advantages Democrats (Radcliff, 1994), it may better serve Democrats to 
work to activate and reinforce and increase turnout instead of spending communication resources 
to convert voters. 
Party Loyalty and Particulars of the 2016 Election 
Republicans may have chosen a comparatively less extreme messaging strategy because they led 
an unpopular Congress and had an unpopular presidential candidate at the top of their ticket 
(Andrews, Katz, & Patel, 2016). Both of those features of the election indicate much greater risk 
to Republicans of losing voters relative to Democrats. Given the number of Republican 
incumbents in Congress, the election was Republicans’ to lose (Jones, 2010), and downplaying 
                                                   
12 We conducted logistic regressions to predict election success using combinations of #polar scores and week, both 
overall and by party, and did not find significant correlations. The results of those regressions are available in the 
supplementary materials. 
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one’s party affiliation is common in close races (Druckman et al., 2011), but we were ultimately 
unable to confirm that close races predict partisanship. 
The 2016 presidential election also presented additional challenges for MCs, especially 
Republicans, deciding whether and how to leverage party affiliation. First, as mentioned above, 
the top of the Republican ticket—Donald Trump, the presidential candidate—was unpopular 
among political elites and used a very different rhetorical style than the party-backed candidates 
(Oliver & Rahn, 2016). Republican MCs may have been less partisan in their rhetoric because 
they were wary of activating their party connection to Trump. Second, again because 
Republicans failed to coalesce around a presidential candidate (MacWilliams, 2016), they may 
have adopted a less extreme but common ground in their messaging. Third, the 2016 election 
may have violated the Downsian model’s assumptions. As Grofman (2004) explains, when one 
of the assumptions of the Downsian model is violated, we can expect divergence rather than 
convergence between the parties. Among those assumptions of the model inapplicable in 2016 
are the following: policies can be located on a single dimension; parties and candidates are part 
of a unified team. 
Limitations and Concerns  
Because we use a one-dimensional scale, dimensionality is a potential limitation of our approach. 
However, we do not believe a rejection of the Downsian model’s assumptions offers a direct 
challenge to the effectiveness of using left-right scales to understand what happened in 2016. 
The original #polar scores paper states, “[#polar scores] assume that the choices of both general 
topics and specific hashtags are motivated by underlying ideology, and therefore, the tags 
themselves reflect partisanship” (Hemphill et al., 2016, p. 375). #Polar scores thus are rooted in 
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the party labels associated with hashtag users. Researchers could use other methods of sorting 
hashtags—topics, locations, etc.—and then calculate #polar scores within those alternate 
groupings. However, if there were no left-right divide or, rather, if there were other dimensions 
across which MCs convey information about themselves, we would have witnessed much less 
coherent groupings among political candidates than those that appear. In rare instances that 
hashtags are non-party-based, it typically represents a period of cooptation where the parties 
compete for control of a particular hashtag (also called “hashjacking”, see Bode, Hanna, Yang, & 
Shah, 2015). As well, and demonstrated by prevalence of geographically-oriented hashtags such 
as #UTpol, the local particulars of races also matter and likely influence messaging strategies. 
#Polar scores is a national measure that may obscure local issues driving campaigns and 
messaging strategies. Indeed, the tight groupings of hashtags and politicians #polar scores reveal 
that even when using a local hashtag or coming from very safe districts that legitimize the use of 
ideologically extreme hashtags, we remain convinced politicians signal their membership in one 
party or another and convey their policy positions through hashtag selection.  
Our evidence shows that the left-right scale continues to dominate on Twitter despite any 
apparent rise in populism or another appeal approach that can be employed by either party. 
Hashtags remain correlated with DW-NOMINATE, and the groups created through #polar scores 
show that Democrats look more similar to each other rather than to Republicans, and vice versa. 
Their correlation to DW-NOMINATE suggests #polar scores are reasonable proxies for spatial 
positions on the policy spectrum. Democrats are well sorted while Republicans are not. 
However, whether Republicans were unified and moderate or disparate and extreme is not 
captured by the #polar scores measure; it’s possible they used common hashtags in very different 
ways and so appeared less extreme than Democrats. Given that Republicans are less sorted, 
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however, this does afford the possibility that the identity of Republicans is in flux or that shared 
hashtags are becoming less popular across the party. It is also possible that clustering along the 
#Polar score continuum indicates party consistency or party message loyalty rather than a 
particular ideological position. There may be fringe groups, or there may be populist tendencies 
in the wake of Trump’s campaign, but hashtag use by MCs reveals a non-overlapping, party-
based orientation to determine policy attention (Shapiro & Hemphill, 2017).  
We also cannot claim that social media foster populism and identity politics given that the 
rhetoric of our political leaders—at least the average MC—is tame in comparison to extremist 
social media accounts of non-politicians. Given their populist nature (Oliver & Rahn, 2016), 
Trump’s communications are distinct from many other Republicans, and we do not specifically 
examine Trump’s communications or how MCs discuss him or the presidential election. Indeed, 
a cursory analysis of commonly used rhetoric by Trump (e.g., #DrainTheSwamp) indicates that it 
was not shared by MCs. Given the widespread use of social media for constituent 
communication, and given the increasing importance of Twitter especially (e.g., Conway et al., 
2015; Groshek & Al-Rawi, 2013; Williams & Gulati, 2010), one might assume 2016 was a 
unique election for social media. It was not: the behaviors legislators exhibited on Twitter can be 
explained with existing campaign messaging theories and not the presence of candidate Trump in 
the Twittersphere. Druckman, Kifer, and Parkin (2017b) found similar results when studying 
web site strategy during the same period, arguing that web campaigning was also relatively 
stable given the technological and political change occurring. Despite Trump’s outsized presence 
on social media and in political news, his communications did not meaningfully impact others’ 
online communication strategies. 
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Future Work 
Future work could examine the effectiveness of MCs’ online communication strategies in a 
number of ways. First, and building off of Glassman (2016) and Roberts and Smith (2003), one 
could focus on the efforts of aspiring party leaders specifically, examining whether they are more 
likely to align with their party’s majority until reaching a leadership position, at which time they 
may attempt to move the party into relatively new directions. These sorts of behavioral shifts by 
elected officials are an important mechanism in moving the median voter over time. 
Alternatively or perhaps in parallel, one could also focus on the risks relating to in-party and out-
party dynamics as described by Jones (2010), particularly how polarization facilitates or inhibits 
non-incumbents from getting elected. Comparing the partisanship patterns from election to 
election is one way to gain insight about these majority- and minority-party impacts. A third 
avenue of future work could focus on the impact of a growing concern about social media use by 
our elected officials, namely the dissemination of falsehoods and negative campaign messages 
by political figures. Negative campaign messages have been shown to increase incivility among 
Twitter users (Hopp & Vargo, 2017), while false stories are widely disseminated and readily 
accepted via social media (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017). 
Methodologically, and building on our findings, future work may account for the effects of 
challengers’ messages and features of the election such as early voting policies or whether the 
election is a primary, a midterm, or a presidential election. For instance, in states with early 
voting and large vote-by-mail efforts, the specific timing of election day may not be as powerful 
a predictor of behaviors as we have demonstrated here. Future work could also examine relevant 
legislative activities, such as the relationship between roll call votes or floor debates and 
campaign messaging. Our results indicated that Democrats were particularly partisan during the 
  
28 
second week of the period we examined, which was when the House debated gun control 
legislation. We did not see a similar spike in partisanship among Republicans that week despite 
their opposition during the floor debate. We must recognize that a comparison of partisanship of 
messages in different media is warranted. For instance, do legislators use Twitter for more 
polarized communication than they do for their floor speeches or press releases? Do challengers 
use more conversion approaches than activation or reinforcement? If differences exist across the 
use of these platforms, it would indicate audience-specific strategies worthy of further scrutiny.  
Conclusion 
Twitter and related social media are increasingly powerful tools for politicians to communicate 
directly with the public and with the press. The results presented above suggest that the two 
major parties in the U.S. use different messaging strategies near elections, and research like ours 
is increasingly attending to the impacts of social media strategies on political outcomes. While 
the use of Twitter in 2016 may not necessarily reveal new messaging strategies, it clarifies key 
differences in the strategies used between the major parties: Democrats were more measurably 
partisan at the outset but moved to the middle over time while Republicans were modest in their 
partisanship at the outset and mostly remained so. In short, partisanship is a messaging strategy 
both parties employ at different times in campaigns. It is also likely used for different purposes—
findings that are all the more relevant today given recent and regular claims made by pundits as 
well as politicians themselves about biased social media and politicized content. 
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